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Kastellet, Copenhagen, Kingdom of Scandinavia, 14 January 1973

The Chairman, Hertug Magnus Eigilsson, called the extraordinary Joint 
Foreign Intelligence Committee [1] meeting to order. A brief Blitz 
precedence note had been circulated in advance and the one-item agenda was 
clear to all. First to speak, as ever, was the Head of the KIT - Friherr 
Erich Korpela - a lifelong operative from the Special Projects Division 
who had unexpectedly succeeded to the supreme post in the Kabinet of the 
Service [2] after the untimely death of the previous incumbent, a more 
conventional aristocrat from the staff and analytical branches of the 
Service. Korpela had a distinct tendency to view most intelligence 
problems as nails to be hammered down and his enthusiasm for special 
projects was unusual in what liked to consider itself a sophisticated and 
cerebral organisation. His appointment had been in the gift of the King, 
who no doubt had his own reasons for the selection.

"Gentlemen. You will all be aware of the SKOVTROLD [3] material which MET 
produced some days ago, which gave us the first indication that there 
might be something untoward occurring in Puerto Rico. My own Service, as 
you will note, has now developed a line of reporting which would tend to 
confirm this. The new material, which originates from a usually reliable 
source in the Prado - and we are rechecking the validity - states that a 
number of logistic enhancements to Puerto Rican infrastructure, in terms 
of transport and port improvements, are in hand. The finance for these 
enhancements originates from foreign sources."

The Head of MET was next. General Professor-Doktor Friherr Axel 
Juul-Pedersen was a career officer, newly promoted both to his current 
rank and to the command of the military intelligence service. Apart from a 
Jaegerkorps tour during the Global War and some experience as the Chief 
Military Adviser in Skt Peterborg during the Sixties, he had previously 
had minimal exposure to the murky waters of intelligence. He was, however, 
a highly experienced military diplomat and a former Director of the Royal 
Scandinavian Defence College [4] and one of the more formidable intellects 
in his Service.

"We concur that there is reason to suppose that our SKOVTROLD source has 
been partially validated. We have requested that the Navy deploy one of 
our technical resources to the West Indies on board a Narhvalen-class 
submersible. We are confident that, knowing where to look, we shall be 
able to provide definitive confirmation of the presence of the German 
assets on the island within a few days of arrival on station, which is 
expected by 20 January."

The meeting went on for another hour, with general agreement on the 
measures it was necessary to take to confirm the reports. As the fog of 
tobacco smoke thickened in the room, the conversation turned to what it 
was necessary to do with the intelligence. Scandinavia had no formal 
alliances, or even overt treaties, with any foreign Power (although some 
of the constituent States had links with others - notably Iceland with the 
CNA), but had a sophisticated network of understandings between its 
intelligence services and those of the CNA and Britain and a very highly 
developed relationship with Kramer Associates' External Security Division. 
Given the extent of the potential threat to the eastern regions of the CNA 
from Puerto Rico, it was important to find a way of making the Confederacy 
aware, without compromising own sources and methods [5]. 

Word, in outline, could be got to Liddy in Burgoyne without significant 
risk, but it was necessary to reinforce the message. It was agreed that 
KIT should organise a conduit from a trusted Spanish source to a known 
British intelligence officer operating from the Lisbon Embassy to pass on 
a fragmentary account from "a brother in San Juan" of the arrival of 
German Air Service officers at the Parador in that city. Liddy's men could 
be relied upon to follow up and develop their own intelligence from that 
lead.

A further issue for discussion was the Mexican field officer's motivation 
in letting slip the original nugget of information. It was agreed that the 
possibility of mounting a Special Projects operation to extract him should 
be examined, but that immediate action would probably be undesirable.

A key question was whether the field officer's action was sanctioned in 
some way. The Chief of the Great General Staff took the floor:

"If I might summarise the issue, just to ensure that my limited intellect 
has fully grasped it? The problem is establishing whether this leak 
indicates some Mexican... hesitancy at the prospect of an intimate German 
strategic involvement in the Western Hemisphere, is it not? We need to 
take a bearing on the Mexicans without making them aware that we have the 
information, in case the action of the field officer was unsanctioned, do 
we not? Do we have any assets in place inside Mexico?"

The two Heads of the active intelligence services exchanged momentary 
glances. Neither was inclined to discuss the details of their apparats 
with the Chief of the Great General Staff, who was undoubtedly a gallant 
and much-decorated officer, but not... intellectually sophisticated. The 
glance sufficed to arrange a separate meeting, a deux, at which this would 
be discussed.

[1] The Joint Foreign Intelligence Committee is in some ways the Defence 
Committee (-) - in that the heads of the intelligence and security 
organisations and the military Chiefs of Staff attend - but it is 
dedicated exclusively to the discussion of papers produced by the 
respective organisations in order to arrive at a collegiate view. While 
bloodletting is rare, a substantial amount of robust argument is accepted.

[2] KIT is organised into operational (Overt, Covert, Technical and 
Special Projects), analytical and staff activities. Supreme leadership is 
exercised through the Kabinet - the Heads of the various divisions in 
council, chaired by the Head of the Service.

[3] SKOVTROLD - covername for unvalidated MET human-source material from 
the Western Hemisphere.

[4] Royal Scandinavian Defence College - Academic institution, a branch of 
the Royal University in Copenhagen, providing a one-year Cand. Dr. course 
for fast-track general officers, admirals and senior Royal Service 
officials, leading to the award of the title Doktor.

[5] The particular SKOVTROLD source in question, in particular, showed 
some potential for development as a potentially valuable USM double - the 
handling officer was engaged in giving him a "flash of ankle" while 
simulating a double in her turn.